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1.1 Introduction 
In this paper, rural-urban interactions are considered as linkages across space reflected in the 
flows of people, goods, services, finance, and information between urban and rural areas. We 
will draw mainly upon findings of research in West Africa, although our argument has a much 
wider purport. We do not attempt to exactly define the ‘urban’ and the ‘rural’, since every 
such attempt is controversial. ‘Rural’ activities like agricultural and livestock breeding occur 
in cities, and an activity usually classified as ‘urban’ (such as manufacturing) may turn up in 
the countryside. Moreover, in Africa a settlement of 5,000 people is typically ‘urban’ in 
morphology and functions, while in India such a settlement is classified as ‘rural’. 
Over the last decades, rural-urban interactions in developing countries have expanded. 
For instance, in the Club du Sahel’s famous West Africa Long-Term Perspective Study, Cour 
and Snrech (1998: 34-62) found that (1) population growth, (2) changes in the natural 
environment, and (3) brutal exposure to world markets occasioned a rapid increase in rural-
urban interactions. Cities expand and extend their influence on the countryside, which in its 
turn modernizes many aspects of social and economic life. Export crops and food production 
for urban markets have made agriculture gradually more market-oriented. Urban markets 
influence rural settlement patterns and agricultural production, in the sense that rural 
population densities have increased along the same geographical lines as urban markets have 
developed. However, while rural areas now quickly respond to urban demand for food, the 
flow of urban goods and services to rural areas generally lags behind. This can be explained 
by, firstly, the increased diversification of rural production, which directly meets rural 
demand for particular goods and services. The non-farm share of African rural household 
income is estimated at 25%-30%, while it amounts to almost 40% in the Sahel (Cour and 
Snrech, 1998: 55). Secondly, it can be explained by the failure of urban areas to produce 
sufficient (both in quantitative and qualitative terms) goods and services for the rural areas. 
This is still considered to be the weak link, which has to be improved if full complementarity 
between urban and rural areas is to be achieved. Thirdly, rural-urban interactions may 
comprise clear-cut competition. For instance, the land market in the rural-urban contact zone 
is troubled by speculation and conflicts between modern and traditional law over property 
rights. 
The three above-mentioned driving forces not only altered production and the flows of 
goods, services and finance, but also resulted in a significant increase in people’s mobility. 
Today, the physical distance between urban and rural areas forms less and less of a constraint 
on social relations. Migration from the countryside to the towns is rapidly increasing, and 
migration trajectories are becoming more complex. In West Africa, urban areas have absorbed 
two-thirds of the region’s population growth. The proportion of town dwellers rose from 13% 
in 1960 to 40% in 1990 (Cour and Snrech, 1998: 45-47). Soon, a clear-cut majority of the 
region’s population will live in urban areas. The regional urban network takes the shape of a 
relatively normal rank/size distribution. 
This being the general picture of rural-urban interactions in West-Africa, the question 
arises how these interactions are being shaped by the people concerned. We have already 
defined rural-urban interactions as linkages across space of flows of people, goods, services, 
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finance, and information. We take these interactions to be reciprocal – i.e., to the possible 
benefit of both parties – rather than exploitative, i.e., to the detriment of one of them, 
generally the countryside. 
Moreover, rural-urban interactions can only be properly understood if analyzed as a 
manifestation of people’s livelihood strategies. Therefore, we will first elaborate on the 
concept of livelihood. Next, we will use this concept to improve our understanding of rural-
urban interactions, grounding it with research findings in West Africa. We will show that 
social capital is a key concept in understanding these interactions, and will use case studies of 
agricultural marketing networks to underpin our argument. 
1.2 Livelihood 
As one of us has already pointed out (De Haan, 2000a: 343), people in developing countries – 
and poor people in particular – undertake manifold activities which yield them food, housing, 
and a monetary income. ‘The most common of these are the production of crops, livestock, 
clothing and housing for home consumption; the production of crops and livestock for sale; 
trade; handicrafts such as basket weaving, pottery, carpentry; seasonal or permanent wage 
labor, which includes children; remittances by kin who have emigrated; loans, alms, gifts and 
sometimes corruption.’ Thus, a person’s livelihood is not necessarily the same as that person 
having a job. Moreover, although obtaining a monetary income is important, it is not the only 
aspect that matters in livelihood. It is quite conceivable for somebody with a low monetary 
income to be better off than someone with a higher monetary income. 
Nowadays, livelihood – even in the remotest corners of the world – is subject to a 
multitude of influences from a broader national and international economic, social and 
political context. According to De Haan (2000a: 344), to achieve a livelihood people make 
use of various assets and resources, which are called capitals. People apply various blends of 
these capitals, which represent various strategies that result in different livelihoods. Thus, 
although the actual mixture may change per livelihood, the capitals involved are: Human 
capital (not only labor, but also skills, experience, creativity, and inventiveness); natural 
capital (land, water, forests, pastures, minerals, etc.); physical capital (food stocks, livestock, 
jewelry, equipment, tools, machinery, etc.); financial capital (money in a savings account at 
the bank or in an old sock, a loan or credit, etc.); and social capital (i.e., the quality of 
relations between people). 
The discussion on such concepts as entitlement (Sen, 1981), claims (Chambers and 
Conway, 1992), and access (Blaikie et al., 1994) has made it clear that the various forms of 
capital do not necessarily have to be held as private property. All these concepts refer to the 
general ability of actors to use the capital at reasonable (i.e., unimpeded) costs when needed 
and wanted. Land can be rented; water and forests can be communally owned; a plough can 
be borrowed or hired; food can be bestowed. What matters is one’s access to the capital. 
According to Blaikie et al. (1994), every social group, every household, and every member of 
it has a particular access profile to capitals, which depends on rights by tradition or by law 
and the way these are exercised. They differ per individual, per household, and per group, and 
may change over time. Actors like social groups, households, and individuals decide on a 
choice of livelihood strategies on the basis of their access profile. 
We consider livelihood as sustainable when the outcome of the processing of different 
types of capital is meaningful in terms of human well-being, and viable in terms of securing 
people against shocks and stresses. ‘Shocks are violent and come unexpectedly; stress is less 
violent, but can last longer. Both have their impact on one or more of the vital ‘capitals’. An 
environmental shock like a flood or an earthquake has its impact on natural, human and 
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physical capital. Drought is an example of a high-level environmental stress; seasonality is a 
well-known example of low-level environmental stress’ (De Haan, 2000a: 347). In West 
Africa, the droughts of 1967-1975 and 1984-1986were a major driving force behind the 
change in rural-urban interactions They not only forced agriculture southward, but also 
induced the flight of ecological refugees to towns in search of food and employment. Many of 
them stayed, and switched from rural to urban livelihoods. Many of those who remained in 
the countryside nowadays supplement their rural livelihoods with a temporary job in town; 
other rural households are supported by remittances from migrants in cities. 
Another source of shocks and stresses is the economy. ‘After independence, the new 
West African states were plunged into the world markets and into a level of economic 
competition for which they were poorly prepared’ (Cour and Snrech, 1998: 35). They 
continued to depend on the export of low-priced commodities. Investments aimed at 
increasing productivity and diversifying the economy failed. Loans to cover increasingly 
expensive import bills after the 1973 oil crisis resulted in a debt crisis in the 1980s. Price 
policies, aimed at keeping food prices in the cities low, chronically frustrated the income 
generation of food producers in rural areas. Subsequent programs of structural adjustment 
undercut social services and only reinforced the integration in low-priced raw material 
markets. All the time, these countries remained heavily dependent on international donor 
transfers. At the same time, increased market integration became the second driving force 
behind the expansion of rural-urban interactions, notably because increased market 
integration stimulated the flow of goods, services, and finance between rural and urban areas. 
The impact of these environmental and economic shocks and stresses was aggravated 
by the third driving force: Rapid population growth. Although sustainable development and 
population growth do not exclude each other by definition (see for an extensive 
argumentation, De Haan, 2000b), the average 2.7% annual population growth rate after 1960 
made the shocks and stresses more dramatic.  
Sen (1981; Drèze and Sen, 1989) has shown that livelihood depends not only on direct 
access to capitals, but also on how the use of capitals is embedded in a wider social, 
economic, political, and natural context. He observed that droughts result in famine only 
under certain conditions. First of all, people can run out of food, but if they find employment 
and thus earn money to buy food, there will be no famine. Sen noted that food is sometimes 
exported from famine areas, precisely because of a lack of purchasing power. Second, where 
food scarcity leads to increasing food prices, markets would normally attract enough food 
from elsewhere, unless they are malfunctioning. Thus, according to Sen, various contextual 
factors like market organization, the labor market, and price policy contribute to or even 
cause the stress in livelihood. 
In short, the concept of livelihood refers not only to access to, and the subsequent 
processing of, capitals, but also to the particular interaction of social groups, households, and 
individuals with their wider context. Livelihood is dynamic because people do not process 
capitals automatically, but with an eye to opportunities offered by the wider context, as they 
are sometimes forced by the same context to resort to particular strategies. Thus, people are 
neither powerless objects nor free agents who can become whatever they choose (De Haan, 
2000a: 350).  
The increased exposure to world markets, continued population growth, and drastic 
events in the natural environment finally resulted  in an adapted livelihood. It is this adapted 
livelihood that gave way to and shaped the intensification of rural-urban interactions. 
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However, we do not think that some kind of an equilibrium has been reached in West 
Africa, represented by a stabilized adapted livelihood. In the present epoch of globalization, 
equilibrium and stability are far away. ‘Globalisation places a premium on flexibility and 
adaptability, and those least able to respond to change are likely to be those adversely 
affected’ (Ellis and Seeley, 2001: 1). Thus, livelihood in West Africa is continuously 
undergoing change. In particular, it is becoming increasingly multi-local, i.e., using capitals 
that are found in different locations, countryside, and city alike. Besides, livelihood is 
becoming multiple or multidimensional, i.e., social groups, households, and individuals are 
combining various livelihood strategies. Nowadays, agricultural production is generally 
combined with rural or urban off-farm employment and trade. The general picture of 
livelihood in West Africa is therefore one of continuous rearrangements of strategies using 
various capitals in different locations. As there is no such thing as the West African 
livelihood, today one often speaks about livelihoods in plural. A proper understanding of 
rural-urban interaction can only be achieved if this general picture is taken into account. 
1.3 Networks: Livelihood and the shaping of rural-urban interactions 
As argued in the preceding section, rural-urban flows can be considered as manifestations of 
livelihoods, and because of the multi-locality and multi-dimensionality of livelihoods, flows 
of goods, services, people, finance and information, they ‘are not usually limited within the 
regional boundaries of a town and its hinterland. Migrants can go to a variety of places, 
including international destinations, and goods and services can be sold and purchased in 
many different locations. From the perspective of a rural household, the pattern of flows is 
thus more likely to resemble a network [our italics] involving multiple linkages with a number 
of villages and towns, rather than revolving around a single urban centre’ (Tacoli, 1998: 12). 
Thus, networks are the way in which livelihoods reveal themselves and shape rural-urban 
relations. 
We consider networks as a set of relations, or ties, between actors. In this case, actors 
can be understood as organizations, social groups, households, or individuals. Social relations 
or ties may range from kinship, friendship, and village membership to patron-client 
relationships, union or political party membership, and ethnic bonds. Social relations are not 
confined to a local scale. Even kinship becomes increasingly multi-local, with relatives 
migrating to various urban and rural areas. Any social relation can be mapped as a tie having 
both a content and a form. It should be noted that social relations can overlap and that people 
may be part of various networks. Note also that we consider with Granovetter (1985) all 
economic actions as embedded in social relations, which means that economic behavior can 
only be understood as part of social behavior. Markets, for example, have to be considered as 
social institutions as well. This implies considering the supposed non-rational residue factor 
of an actor’s behavior in economic analysis, as a rational choice. 
The content of a tie can include anything from goods, services, friendship or love, to 
money, information, and advice. The form of a tie concerns the strength of the relation and 
may range from weak to strong. Relations between family members, friends, and close 
colleagues are considered to be strong ties. So too are those between people who frequently 
communicate with each other and with other actors in the same network, and who put a high 
value on their relations. Weak ties occur between members of different networks, i.e., 
between people who have less contact and who value their relations less. At first sight, strong 
ties seem eminent in sustaining a livelihood. In family and friends one has trust, and they are 
the first to call upon. Agricultural work and food are shared among family and friends in the 
village. Remittances from migrants in the city are mostly received by kin. Granovetter (1983), 
however, has pointed out an interesting issue that may also help to shed light on the value of 
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different forms of ties for globalizing livelihoods. He argues that weak ties are important for 
people looking for a job. Even the modern meaning of ‘networking’ emerged in this context: 
People looking for a job benefit more from contacts with members of other networks than 
with the one(s) they are part of. Contacts with members of another network may yield new 
information about job opportunities or may once more lead to new contacts. This does not 
mean that complete strangers offer the most valuable information. Granovetter shows that 
employers in search of personnel prefer to recruit candidates who are vouched for by others. 
There is only one complication. People usually value information from strong ties as more 
trustworthy than information from weak ties. This may hinder the recognition of feasible 
opportunities offered by weak ties. At this point, it is of importance to refer to what has been 
argued about livelihood in globalization : If globalization places a premium on flexibility and 
adaptability, leading to continuously changing multi-local and multidimensional livelihoods, 
then this premium on adaptation is perhaps better realized through weak rather than strong 
ties. 
Finally, Rose (1998: 3) usefully summarizes the relevant distinction between informal 
and formal networks that actors use in procuring a livelihood, at the same time revealing the 
overlap with strong and weak ties. Informal networks ‘are face-to-face relationships between 
a limited number of individuals who know each other and are bound together by kinship, 
friendship or propinquity. Informal networks are institutions in the sociological sense of 
having patterned and recurring interaction. Lacking legal recognition, full-time officials, 
written rules, and their own funds, they are not formal organisations’. Informal networks are 
therefore more likely to display strong ties. Formal networks ‘are rule-bound bureaucratic, 
have legal personality and secure revenue from the market or the state. A formal organization 
can have individuals as its members’, such as a political party, or its members can be 
organizations such as an urban NGO providing support to village credit cooperatives. ‘Formal 
organisations are a necessary part of a modern [italics in original] society, for it requires 
impersonal bureaucratic organisations of state and market that can routinely produce complex 
goods such as automobiles’. There are many links between informal and formal networks, and 
sometimes the distinction between them is vague. ‘Even if a network has a formal identity, 
such as a rural cooperative, face-to-face networks tend to be horizontal and diffuse and an 
individual’s reputation for helpful cooperation is more important than cash payments and 
bureaucratic regulations’. Formal networks do not preclude strong ties, even though weak ties 
are more likely to occur than in informal networks. We will return to this matter after the 
following section. 
1.4 Rural-urban interactions: Food trade in Benin 
The West African coastal state of Benin stretches roughly 800 km from the sub-humid coastal 
zone at the Bight of Benin in the south to the semi-arid Sahel zone at the Niger river in the 
north. Because of the presence of various agro-ecological zones, food production is highly 
diverse. However, when it comes to rural-urban interactions in the form of food trade, maize, 
yam, and cattle are prominent on a national scale. The trade in these goods is in the hands of 
private traders and integrated into larger international West African markets. 
1.4.1 Maize trade 
Maize is produced in both the south and the north, but only in the south is it a vital 
subsistence crop for farmers. Yet, the major maize granaries are located in the north. 
Maize is traded from rural areas to urban areas (and in periods of shortage, back to 
rural areas) through informal and formal markets. In the south, the first exchange of maize at 
harvest time often takes place along the road between the farm and the formal market place. 
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Difficulties of transport, road conditions or lack of funds to pay formal market taxes are the 
reasons why farmers accept the risk of selling at a lower price than at the market place itself. 
Informal market transactions occur mainly in the north when quantities are large or roads are 
inaccessible to public transport. Subsequently, the maize finds it way through formal markets, 
starting with the village market where producers sell to consumers as well as to assemblers, 
retailers, and local wholesalers. Most traders, in turn, sell the maize at the urban regional 
market, which has strong linkages with the village market. Especially in the north, flows of 
maize are assembled and channelled to urban consumer markets. The latter are pure 
distribution markets where maize and other goods are sold by wholesalers and retailers, and 
bought by retailers and consumers throughout the year (Lutz, 1994: 61-63). 
In the period of abundance (June-January), maize is typically traded from the rural 
areas in the south and center of the country to urban areas in the south, and from the rural 
areas in the north to urban areas in Niger, and to a lesser extent in Togo (Klaasse Bos and 
Krogt, 1991). In the lean season (March-June), the reduced supply from the south and center 
is compensated for by the north. 
It was argued in the previous sections that livelihood strategies explain the way rural-
urban interactions, such as these maize flows, are shaped. In fact, maize farmers, mostly sell 
their surplus in relatively small quantities whenever some kind of household expense needs 
financing. Thus their maize stock represents a liquid type of physical capital. This leads to the 
frequent selling of small quantities and laborious collection activities at the start of the 
marketing channel. However, the poor accessibility and high transportation costs also orient 
their sales strategy towards informal markets at farm gate or roadside. A fine-meshed rural 
collection pattern of markets is the result. The same applies to the maize distribution in urban 
areas: As most urban consumers have very limited financial capital at their disposal, they buy 
in very small quantities. 
With respect to the livelihood strategies of other actors, Lutz (1994: 66-71) 
distinguishes wholesalers and retailers. The former buys from farmers and retailer-assemblers 
and sells to the latter, who in turn sells to retailers. Wholesalers completely depend on their 
own financial capital, and the significant dissimilarities among them are linked to this. 
Wholesalers with limited financial capital cannot invest in credit and storage. Despite their 
low turnover, these petty wholesalers perform an indispensable function at the first stage of 
the marketing channel. The number of wholesalers with much financial capital is limited. 
They buy much larger quantities and are able to invest in buying and selling networks. This 
means that they are also much more flexible in their choice of markets at which to buy and 
sell maize. This ability is crucial to understanding food marketing in Benin, because these 
traders are in fact the only ones capable of directly connecting rural supply and urban 
demand, which are hundreds of kilometers apart. 
Retailers buy maize from wholesalers for sale to consumers at convenient locations 
and times. Moreover, by re-packing, sorting, and processing they are able to offer maize in 
the requested forms and quantities. To increase the volume assembled, some retailers have 
joined forces to set up their own assembling networks. 
In addition to wholesalers and retailers, commission agents such as brokers and 
assemblers are key actors in the marketing channel. Non-resident wholesalers arriving at the 
large urban markets of Bohicon or Cotonou find it hard, especially in the period of 
abundance, to sell their maize without much delay to retailers, whom, moreover, they hardly 
know. To save time, they store their produce in a broker’s warehouse. Subsequently, and on a 
commission basis, the broker sells the maize to retailers on behalf of the wholesaler. The 
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broker knows the retailers well and often sells on credit, which considerably speeds up the 
sale of the wholesaler’s stock. Some wealthy wholesalers do not even wait for their stock to 
be sold, but return to the production zone for more produce and collect their cash later. Others 
simply send a truck of maize to their broker without appearing in the city. 
Assemblers buy maize on behalf of wholesalers at the farm gate, roadside, or village 
market. Like brokers, they do not incur a financial risk since their transactions are pre-
financed by the wholesaler. Their work is advantageous to both farmers and wholesalers. 
Farmers save time and transportation costs; wholesalers save time and contract out an activity 
for which specific skills are required. ‘… assembly is quite a time-consuming activity: One 
has to attract farmers willing to sell their surpluses and negotiate a suitable price or measured 
quantity. Assemblers master the necessary local measuring techniques which consist of 
procuring the maximum of produce per unit measure, the price being more or less determined 
by the type of measure used’ (Lutz, 1994: 69). 
In practice, there is no clear distinction between the groups involved in trading maize 
from rural to urban areas. Brokers may do wholesaling at their own risk if opportunities are 
good. Petty wholesalers may turn into assemblers if their financial capital is insufficient to 
trade for their own account, and may start to wholesale again alongside assembling for a 
wealthy wholesaler when their financial capital has grown again. 
Figure 1 – Benin: Main markets and trading circuits 
1.4.2 Yam trade 
Yams are produced in central and northern Benin. As well as being locally consumed, they 
are mainly traded to the south, where the urban market of Cotonou constitutes the main outlet. 
Adanguidi (2000) distinguishes three separate, ethnically (Fon, Bariba-Tchabe, and Dendi-
Taneka) dominated trading circuits through which fresh and processed yams from different 
production zones are traded to Cotonou. 
Yams are purchased predominantly at the farm gate. Wholesalers transport the 
produce to the city. Various reasons are found for the ethnic specialization in trading circuits. 
Firstly, yams tend to have specific characteristics in taste and texture according to their 
production zone. Consequently, the consumers who belong to an ethnic group that originates 
from a particular production zone, typically prefer to buy yams that are grown there. 
Secondly, at the Cotonou market, the use of measures to determine weight and quantity 
differs according to the ethnicity of wholesalers and retailers. For example, Fon wholesalers 
sell by balance, a technique which has not been mastered by their Bariba or Tchabe 
colleagues, who prefer to sell by pile or sack. The third reason seems to be the most 
important, however: When his truckload of yams arrives in Cotonou, it is hard for the 
wholesaler to sell them all at once. Storage is needed, but storage capacity is scarce and, 
moreover, it is important to sell as quickly as possible if prices are favorable. Therefore, each 
wholesaler guarantees his access to the market by cultivating relations with a group of 
retailers, who typically belong to the same ethnic group. For instance, to ensure sufficient 
storage capacity for yams or yam flour, Fon wholesalers maintain good relations with the 
market officials who rent out storage rooms from time to time. In addition, wholesalers 
mainly sell to retailers belonging to their own ethnic group, since much of the produce is 
provided on credit. Otherwise, the wholesalers use the services of brokers who store the 
produce in their warehouse in exchange for a commission and subsequently sell to retailers, 
again for a commission.   
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Adanguidi (2000: 119) concludes that there is a strong personal content and a clear 
regional-ethnic bias in the various relations that constitute the trade organization and, 
consequently, the type of rural-urban interaction. Although relations are personal, he does not 
consider them as power-neutral. Mainly because of differences in available financial and 
social capital, different actors in the trade organization have different powers. Nevertheless, 
he considers this type of rural-urban interaction as a relation of partnership rather than patron-
client. 
1.4.3 Cattle trade 
Compared to other West African coastal countries, Benin has a large cattle population. Most 
cattle keeping is concentrated in the north, because the south is infested with the tsetse fly. 
Some three-quarters of the cattle supply originates from pastoralists; the remainder stems 
from farmers who mainly sell draught animals. 
As in maize marketing, a distinction can be made between informal and formal 
markets, which are situated along the marketing channel that links rural and urban areas. The 
informal market is represented by farm-gate transactions between pastoralists, farmers, 
butchers, and traders, who sell and buy cattle in order to expand herds, to train draught 
animals, to slaughter, or to make a profit on a subsequent sale, respectively. Usually, three 
types of formal markets are distinguished. At collection markets, local traders buy from 
pastoralists and farmers. These markets are considerably less numerous, and consequently 
more dispersed, than the village maize markets, indicating the importance of informal cattle 
marketing. Distribution markets are typically second-level markets where local traders sell to 
long-distance traders, who in turn sell to butchers at the urban markets of Lome (Togo), 
Cotonou (Benin), Ibadan and Lagos (Nigeria). However, cattle flows between rural and urban 
areas may provide a more complicated picture (Quarles van Ufford, 1999: 119-151). This is 
mainly due to the multitude of transactions between formal and informal markets in the north. 
The expanding cotton economy in particular explains the rise in the number of local 
transactions for animal traction, cattle breeding or investment purposes.  
As with the maize trade, different types of traders are active in the cattle trade. Yet, 
due to the diverging characteristics of the produce involved, both trades have developed their 
own specializations and concomitant organization. The maize trade organization, as outlined 
above, is dominated by a relay type of transaction carried out by independent actors. In relay 
trade, the commodity is effectively exchanged and ownership is transferred from one actor to 
another (farmer-trader, trader-consumer). In network trade, no transfer of property occurs; the 
commodity changes hands between different representatives or employees of a chief trader 
(farmer-network-butcher-consumer). Both types of trade organization are not mutually 
exclusive. Assemblers and brokers in the maize trade, for instance, acting on behalf of 
wealthy traders and retailers sometimes purchase maize through assembling networks. 
However, maize is much easier to standardize in terms of quality and measure than cattle are. 
This makes the maize market more transparent and explains its organization around the most 
ordinary form of consecutive transactions between sellers and buyers. Cattle trade is to a 
much larger extent vertically integrated and leaves less room for individual maneuver. 
What can be said about the archetypal composition of a trade network? Central to the 
network is the network chief. His position is based on a combination of material wealth, 
prestige, and an extensive network of personal relations. He decides upon most of the 
transaction details (such as time schedule, numbers, and destination) and takes care of all 
financial arrangements. 
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For the purchase of cattle, the chief may employ various collectors. In relay trade, 
these would be independent retailer-assemblers. In the cattle trade, however, collectors are 
part of the chief’s network. He advances them a certain amount of money to buy cattle at 
informal markets or small local collection markets. Usually, the collectors are experienced 
cattle buyers who typically confine their activities to a specific area. Even at formal market 
places, the collectors, as well as the traders, use the services of brokers. 
Brokers are omnipresent at cattle markets all over West Africa. For a fixed 
commission from both buyer and seller, they witness the transaction, assure the solvability of 
the buyer, the origin and state of health of the animal, and guarantee that the animal has not 
been stolen. Typically, a broker is well acquainted with the cattle market in question and will 
try to find potential buyers for his clients, who are mostly pastoralists. They entrust the broker 
with the cattle they have for sale. As such, he performs a crucial service in the negotiation 
process, alternately informing buyer and seller about the respective bids. Using their prestige 
and material wealth, traders attempt to win over certain brokers by providing them with the 
occasional, financial favor. Brokers are prone to providing seller-pastoralists with erroneous 
information about the maximum traders are willing to pay, or about the alleged absence of 
other potential buyers. Thus, establishing relations with brokers is clearly to the financial 
advantage of the traders (Quarles van Ufford, forthcoming). 
An itinerant trader may be in charge of transporting the animals to the final destination 
market. Besides the cattle, a sum to cover various transaction costs is entrusted to him. Upon 
return, the sales revenue is returned to the chief in cash or in the form of consumer goods 
which he ordered before departure. Yet, most chiefs prefer to make the final sale at the 
destination market themselves. In the absence of price standardization, only marketing 
experience can determine the right price. Still, an experienced herder will take care of 
trekking the cattle over at least part of the itinerary. The risks involved in this, as well as the 
considerable value of cattle entrusted to the herder, explain the observation that the chief 
typically prefers to maintain a network relation with this person who is so crucial to his 
trading activities. 
At the sales markets on the West African coast, a crucial function in the trade network 
is performed by the landlord-broker who accommodates the itinerant long-distance traders 
and assists them in selling their cattle. In fact, he can be considered a cross-cultural broker, 
since the butchers to whom cattle are sold typically belong to a different ethnic group. The 
landlord is permanently established at the destination market. A chief trader will usually deal 
with one landlord to whom he may be related by kinship, ethnicity, or common region of 
origin. To lodge the traders, a landlord operates one or more residences. He provides meals 
and market information, and accompanies the trader to the market. Because of his 
acquaintance with the butchers, he is able to identify creditworthy and reliable customers, and 
is even prepared to run a debt collection service. Until the departure of the trader, he keeps 
the money and takes care of the administration (Quarles van Ufford, 1999: 47-51). 
 
1.5 Discussion: Reassessing the role of social capital and networks in 
rural-urban interactions 
The strategies of maize, yam, and cattle traders revealed that rural-urban interactions are 
shaped to a large extent by people’s livelihood strategies. It is also clear that although trade is 
an economic activity, rural-urban interactions are embedded in social relations. This prompts 
us to reassess the role of social capital in rural-urban interactions and consequently in 
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livelihood and to demonstrate that networks, personal contacts, trust, and prestige are vital 
determinants of the patterns we observe.  
There is no fixed definition of social capital, and the concept is discussed in many 
contexts other than in relation to livelihood. According to the Social Capital Initiative (World 
Bank, 1998: 1), social capital ‘includes the institutions, the relationships, the attitudes and 
values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social 
development’. It is ‘not simply the sum of institutions which underpin society, but also the 
glue that holds them together’. Within this overall perspective, three concepts of social capital 
can be distinguished. The original and most narrow one is associated with Putnam’s (1993) 
analysis of civic traditions, democracy, and regional development in Italy. He explained 
regional differences in development by corresponding differences in social structures and 
networks. To him, social capital consists of social networks and associated norms that have an 
effect on the productivity of the community. He pointed at the tradition of rich networks of 
organized reciprocity and solidarity, embodied in guilds, religious fraternities, and 
neighborhood organizations in Italy, that laid the foundations for successful economic 
development. Trust-fostering norms, coordination of actions, information about 
trustworthiness of members, and the potential to serve as platforms of collaboration for new 
types of activity make these networks so interesting to Putnam. 
Secondly, Coleman (1988) defined social capital much more broadly, as a variety of 
different entities which have in common that they consist of some aspect of social structure 
and facilitate certain actions of actors within the structure. Where Putnam (1993) thinks that 
vertical relations based on authority have a limited capacity for collective action and 
economic performance, and horizontal relations based on trust and shared values are more 
likely to have economic success (Bebbington 1999), Coleman values both horizontal and 
vertical organizations by arguing that certain forms of social capital may be useful for one 
action but useless or harmful for another. The key elements to Coleman are trustworthiness, 
the capability of information provision, and the execution of effective sanctions. 
Thirdly, Olsen (1982) and North (1990) include in social capital the most formalized 
institutional relationships and structures such as government, law, and civil liberties. Clearly, 
these three concepts of social capital are not mutually exclusive, but overlap and encompass 
each other.  
Although the debate about social capital sometimes takes euphoric dimensions, it is 
evident that it cannot be a panacea for development. Nor will social capital have positive 
effects for everyone in all cases. If it has positive effects on one group, it may be to the 
detriment of others. Nevertheless, social capital clearly has the potential to enhance people’s 
livelihood, and one may expect that it improves the sustainability of that livelihood in terms 
of coping and adaptation. The role of social capital is particularly interesting with respect to 
the access it may provide to other capitals and to wider institutions of state, market, and civil 
society. Especially Bebbington (1999) dwells upon the relationship between social capital and 
access from both the inside out and the outside in. With respect to ‘from the inside out’, he 
points at the mobilization of social relations for accessing capitals, so-called claim-making. 
Shared cultural identity and strong intra-group communication etc. facilitate group members’ 
access to local capitals. Examples are access to financial capital through rotating saving 
schemes, or to arable land through a common property regime. Moving up the scale, strong 
networks with state or civil society actors may facilitate access to health and educational 
services. In the same vein, networks with other market actors may open up new markets. 
Finally, on a national scale, strong social capital in the form of regional or national political 
parties or trade associations may influence trade policies. With respect to ‘from the outside in’ 
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Bebbington (1999) notes that little is known about how external institutions, such as state 
institutions, can reach down to enhance people’s access to capitals. He mainly points at 
synergistic relations in service provision between state institutions and local formal 
organizations. 
From our discussion of the maize, yam, and cattle trade it has become clear that social 
capital plays an important role in trade organization and in the livelihood of traders, 
producers, and consumers. Contacts, trust, and information about the trustworthiness of actors 
and the trustworthiness of market information are prominent issues in this respect. 
In the organization of the yam trade, for instance, strong personal ties and a clear 
regional-ethnic identity were depicted. Yam wholesalers must trust retailers to pay them once 
the latter have sold the produce to consumers. Equally they must trust brokers for selling their 
stock at a reasonable price. Since written contracts hardly exist or can hardly be enforced in 
the absence of collateral, trust on the basis of long-standing personal contacts and endorsed 
by regional-ethnic bonds is the only alternative. 
Also in the maize trade, wholesalers establish relations of trust with their brokers, who 
store and sell their produce. They also lend assemblers money to buy maize at the farm gate, 
roadside, or village market. Lutz (1994: 60) believes that retailers provide consumers with 
credit for social rather than economic reasons. In view of the above, we agree with 
Granovetter (1985) that economic and social considerations cannot be separated from each 
other. Providing credit to consumers is as much a socially embedded economic act as a 
wholesaler’s providing a retailer with produce on credit. In the cases Lutz mentions, trust 
(i.e., social capital) substitutes financial capital, which is scarce. As such, social capital 
guarantees the maintenance of the clientele and the continuity of the business. 
Finally, it appeared that social capital is equally indispensable in the cattle trade. For 
instance, a trader requires a minimum of contacts with suppliers, herders, brokers or butchers 
to facilitate his transactions. In the past, his file of potential suppliers – i.e. pastoralists - was 
even more important given the near absence of formal cattle markets. It is interesting to note 
in this respect that until recently the relationship with a trader constituted an important asset 
for a pastoralist as well, notably to get access to ‘urban affairs’. A trader could, for instance, 
assist in contacting local authorities in order to resolve problems concerning tenure, cattle 
thefts, and the like. Hence, upon establishment in a particular area, pastoralists would seek to 
contact a local trader in order to build a sustained relationship of ‘mutual services’. 
Nowadays, this particular manifestation of social capital bridging the rural-urban divide has 
lost some of its importance, since many pastoralists have integrated urban markets in one way 
or another, and have become acquainted with city life. For traders, however, preferential sales 
contacts with pastoralists remain of substantial weight in their trading practices. 
In the cattle trade as well, social capital and trust are intimately related. Giving large 
sums of money to a collector to buy cattle demonstrates the confidence of the network chief in 
his collaborator. Sending 30 head of cattle on the hoof over the Nigerian border to avoid 
customs controls and to sell at more profitable prices at the Ibadan terminal market, means 
putting a lot of confidence in herders. In fact, a brief description of the management of trading 
networks gives us a perfect insight into how social capital can be created, maintained, and 
expanded, and how trust is obtained.  
Generally, there are three types of relations a chief trader maintains with his 
collaborators. Firstly, there are kinship relations with his children or cousins. This is less 
obvious than it seems at first sight. Although sons do participate in his network, the working 
relation with their father may be less close than expected. Given the often large number of 
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sons in view of the polygamous households of many traders, and the danger of dispersal of 
the inheritance and decline of the enterprise when Islamic heritage laws are applied after his 
death, a father-trader may select his successor at an early stage and transfer a substantial part 
of the business to him. Intense work relationships havealso been observed between a trader 
and his cousins. In general, kinship relations are crucial for starting traders, since they benefit 
from the experience, prestige and financial capacity of their father or uncle.  
A second type of relationship is the matrimonial alliance. In this case, an individual 
becomes linked to the chief through marriage to one of his daughters or female kin. In fact, 
this often concerns the revaluation of an employer-employee relation to a kinship relation, 
and happens to the best performing employees. They will subsequently have many more 
opportunities to start their own business, while remaining close to the chief-trader. 
Thirdly, there is the employer-employee relationship, which usually takes the form of 
a patron-client relation or an apprenticeship. Here, the apprentice is ‘indebted’ to the chief 
because the latter has rendered him one or more specific services – such as the provision of 
food, lodging or a trade  education – or has helped him out with a particular problem. The 
apprentice reciprocally performs trade activities for the trader. In due time, these trade 
activities typically become more complicated and involve increasing responsibilities and 
trust, as in the case of an apprentice selling his patron’s cattle at a far away market. His 
education completed, the apprentice will be symbolically liberated. At that time, he will have 
accumulated his own working capital and will thus be able to set up his own business as an 
independent trader, even though he will certainly maintain close economic and social ties 
with his former chief.   
These examples reveal the substance of social capital. In turn, social capital may 
provide access to other capitals such as information. Through privileged contacts, a trader 
obtains information on prices, trekking routes, etc., in a market typically characterised by the 
non transparency of such parameters. Social capital may have a religious underpinning, too. 
In West Africa, the traditional trade sectors – such as those for food grains and cattle – are 
generally dominated by Moslem traders. Islam is often referred to as providing traders with a 
set of elementary trading regulations as well as binding them together into a supra-
community. It provides a set of norms and values which have a significant impact on trade 
organization and the strategies of traders. ‘For a long time, the function of landlord-broker has 
enjoyed considerable prestige. In the Islamic setting of long-distance trade, the fact of 
receiving multiple visitors certainly contributes to this. “Guests are presents from God” a 
landlord once said’ (Quarles van Ufford, 1999: 22 and 50). The title El Hadj, earned by a 
completing a pilgrimage to Mecca, adds to a trader’s prestige and trustworthiness. For that 
matter, Bebbington (1999) would prefer to call this cultural capital. Note that Islam not only 
supported the bonds in the West African pre-colonial Haoussa trade networks and diaspora, 
but protected the minorities in the different trading towns from what Portes and Landolt 
(1996) call the downside of social capital. Successful entrepreneurs are often besieged by 
relatives and friends, who expect to receive assistance from the wealthy businessman. This 
might become such a burden to him that the continuity of the business is threatened. The 
different religion of the diaspora made its members less vulnerable to claim-making from the 
host society. We may conclude this discussion on the meaning of social capital for livelihood 
as follows. Social capital plays a key role in livelihood maintenance. It is defined as the 
institutions, relationships, attitudes, and values that govern interactions between people and 
contribute to economic and social development. Social capital can be a value in itself, because 
it contributes to people’s sense of well-being through belonging and identity. What is crucial, 
however, is that the processing of the other vital capitals in pursuit of a livelihood is mediated 
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through social capital, because social capital gives the actor access to other capitals. Our 
analysis of the cattle trade convincingly demonstrated that social capital may provide a person 
with access to other capitals. Both kinship relations and apprenticeships are types of social 
capital creation through which other vital capitals (information, skill, finance) in cattle 
marketing become accessible to the starting trader.  
However, some traders succeed to make their way into trade relying only partly on 
kinship relations or apprenticeships. This shows that the role of social capital should not be 
glorified to the extreme, nor should its importance be neglected. The observation rather partly 
confirms the analysis of Granovetter (1983) concerning strong and weak ties. To become 
successful in cattle marketing, newcomers who do not belong to the inner circle of insiders 
have to create social capital, but they do so by exploring weak ties. Their entry is not 
facilitated by social capital based on strong ties, but primarily by the possession of other 
capitals, i.e., skill and finance. Notwithstanding this, comparatively more success is still 
gained through the kinship and the apprentice modes, which falsifies Granovetter’s opinion of 
strong ties. With respect to the informal and formal kinds of networks identified by Rose 
(1998), we did not come across any significant formal network in trade organization that 
contributed to a trader’s livelihood. This complies with our general impression that rural-
urban interactions in West Africa, also when they concern flows of people, mainly comprise 
informal networks. 
More practically, social capital consists of (1) relationships of trust, reciprocity, and 
exchange that facilitate cooperation, reduce transaction costs, and provide safety nets amongst 
actors; (2) networks, either vertical or horizontal, that increase people’s trust and ability to 
cooperate and expand their access to wider institutions; and (3) membership of more formal 
groups, which often entails adherence to common rules, norms, and sanctions (DFID, 1999). 
Through social capital, the quantity and quality of the other forms of capital can be 
improved. Mutual trust and reciprocity lower the costs of working together. Lower costs 
improve the efficiency of economic actions, and therefore reinforce financial capital. Rules 
and sanctions prevent the overexploitation of natural resources and induce its conservation. 
When people are linked by common norms and sanctions they may more easily form new 
organizations to pursue interests, including claim-making in the political domain. 
Finally, at least two other vital capitals (in addition to human, natural, physical, 
financial, and social) have been detected in the analysis of rural-urban interaction, i.e., 
information capital and religious/cultural capital. We feel that there are good arguments to 
classify religious or cultural capital under social capital, since religion is so closely linked to 
norms, sanctions, trust, and formalized groups. However, in the case of trading strategies it 
was appropriate to discuss them separately. With regard to information capital, our analysis 
showed that information is provided through networks of social relations, and even that 
information (about the trustworthiness of the members) is one of the prerequisites for a 
successful network. However, in the case of marketing, information does not necessarily have 
to be obtained through social networks; soon in fact – if the formalization of markets 
continues at the present pace – it will not be obtained through such networks at all. Therefore 
it may be advisable to include information as a vital resource in the livelihood analysis of 
rural-urban interactions. 
1.6 Conclusion 
We have oriented our analysis of modern rural-urban interaction toward livelihood strategies 
that shape the flows of food items from rural to urban areas in West Africa. By paying 
attention to food trade, we were also able to pay additional attention to other interactions such 
 13
as flows of people and information. Our approach showed that it pays off to analyze rural-
urban interactions such as trade as socially embedded economic activities. Through an 
analysis of networks and social relations, we have determined the prominent role of social 
capital in livelihood. The processing of vital capitals in the pursuit of a livelihood is mediated 
through social capital, precisely because social capital facilitates access to these other forms 
of capital. We therefore consider social capital as a historical requirement in linking the rural 
and the urban. 
One question that remains to be answered concerns the endurance of our conclusions 
in the light of increasing globalization. Market structures in West Africa are increasingly 
formalized. This formalization appears with the emergence of more formal markets, new 
modes of market organization, and the subsequent decline of such traditional institutions as 
brokerage. This results in highly personalized informal exchange configurations between 
buyer and seller, becoming impersonal formal market relations. Informal markets become 
outshone by formal markets. Brokers on formal markets give way to marketing committees, 
which officially register transactions. Price information is increasingly distributed through 
public channels and more rapidly available, reducing the benefits of network information. 
Yet, this tendency is unevenly developing in different markets. We have already pointed at 
differences between the maize and the cattle market. Standardization is easier in the maize 
trade than in the cattle trade, which explains the prevalence of relay relations in maize trade 
as compared to network relations in cattle trade. Moreover, formalization in market relations 
is more ahead in more densely populated areas with a certain volume of market production 
than in sparsely populated, remote areas. We expect that increasing formalization will result 
in a decline in the significance of social capital in market relations. On the other hand, 
because globalization places a premium on flexibility and adaptability, we postulate that the 
premium on adaptation is easier to cash in by maintaining social capital. 
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